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1. Introduction
Throughout the tangled history of the British engage-
ment with European integration, there has been an in-
tersection between the international roles conceived,
aspired to or performed by the UK and the European in-
stitutions. Both entities have been subject to debate not
only about the nature of their international identities
but also about the ways in which British membership
of the European project has affected both parties. This
mutual entanglement, intersection and debate has been
focused and concentrated by the process of Brexit (both
as a discursive phenomenon and as a process of negoti-
ation and role-playing), and is also strongly informed by
expectations of the international roles to be played both
by the UK and by the EU in the post-Brexit world. This ar-
ticle sets out to provide a framework for the analysis of
the interplay between Brexit and the EU’s international
roles, broadly defined, with the general aim of illuminat-
ing some of the processes that have shaped it, of provid-
ing insight into some of the dynamics that are likely to
shape the future of EU external action and of placing the
impact of Brexit into the context of challenges faced by
the EU in the global arena more generally.
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2. Discourses of Globalism in British and European
Foreign Policy
Conceptions of external action1 both in the UK and in the
European project have been strongly shaped by ‘histori-
cal’ forces, which have produced both a desire for global
reach and a series of contradictions arising from that de-
sire and from the institutional or material limitations of
foreign policy elites. One of the most powerful images in
the shaping of UK foreign policy after the Second World
War was that of the ‘three circles of power and influence’
discerned among other by Winston Churchill. This gave
rise to the notion that the UK was uniquely placed in the
world order, at the intersection of transatlantic relations,
the European order and the imperial/colonial networks
that later transmuted into the (British) Commonwealth,
a view which was buttressed by the UK’s position as a
permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nu-
clear weapons power (Gaskarth, 2013, Chapter 5). Such
an image of ‘exceptionalism’ has been prominent re-
cently in the discourse of leading ‘Brexiteers’; whilst this
is only one of several different ‘Brexit narratives’ embed-
ded in the UK debate, it gains power from the potency of
narratives linked to the ‘Anglosphere’ and the ‘special re-
lationship’ with the US (Daddow, 2019; Hill, 2019; Kenny
& Pearce, 2018).
At the same time, a version of the notion of the
‘three circles’ had and has important implications for the
European project itself. The UK has been far from the
only member state with aspirations to an expansive and
‘global’ foreign policy, although only the UK and France
have a number of the key elements of global status (for
example, nuclear weapons and permanent membership
of the UN Security Council). The tension between glob-
alist aspirations and the realities of diversity among EU
member states has been one of the shaping forces in
the development of ‘European foreign policy’ as an as-
pect of external action since the mid-1980s if not since
the 1950s; and in important ways this has been shaped
by the EC–EU’s engagement in transatlantic relations
and the developing world as well as in the European
order itself (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014). Globalist dis-
courses have thus viedwithmore regionalist and at times
severely parochial elements in the development of the
EU’s international role, and there has been a continuing
tension between EU external action as ameans of export-
ing European integration, as a channel for the develop-
ment of a ‘real’ global foreign policy and as a means of
promoting member states’ interests (M. Smith, 2006).
In the current conjuncture, as symbolised by the
publication of the EU’s Global Strategy Paper (European
External Action Service, 2015; European Union, 2016;
Tocci, 2017) in the week following the UK referendum on
membership of the Union, two very pointed discourses
of globalism are at the centre of the Brexit debates
(Adler-Nissen, Galpin, & Rosamond, 2017). First, central
to the Brexiteers’ vision of a UK freed from the bonds of
EU membership is the aspiration to ‘global Britain’ both
in the international political economy and in the inter-
national security order. The idea that the UK has been
prevented from playing a true global role by EU mem-
bership, and the belief that post-Brexit it will be able to
play a new and leading global role, is fundamental to the
discourse of those that espouse a ‘clean’ Brexit, and re-
lies heavily on the assumption that there are new and ex-
citing opportunities for an ‘independent’ UK in a chang-
ing global arena (Hill, 2019; Morris, 2011; Oliver, 2018,
Chapter 7). The competing idea that the UK is very much
a secondary power, and that without EU membership
the country will be exposed to new risks and costs is sim-
ilarly central to the discourses of those who oppose a
‘clean’ Brexit and wish to retain as close a link as possible
with the EU post-Brexit. Second, on the side of European
external action, the Global Strategy Paper introduced a
new discourse of globalism into the debate, with its call
for a global strategy not only in terms of reach but also
in terms of the mobilisation of resources by the Union
(European Union, 2016; K. Smith, 2017; Tocci, 2017; see
also Haastrup, Wright, & Guerrina, 2019). In developing
such a strategy, a post-Brexit ‘global Britain’ is inevitably
going to be a central shaping force, on geopolitical, geo-
economic, institutional and cultural grounds. It can of
course equally be argued that the absence of the UK
from current and future developments in EU external ac-
tion provides the Union with new opportunities for insti-
tutional and policy development in the changing global
arena. In this sense, the discourses of ‘global Britain’ and
‘global Europe’ are deeply interdependent, and in many
ways Brexit reflects the position of the UK as a ‘pivotal
outlier’ which has simultaneously been a source of capa-
bilities for the Union and a constraint on its external ac-
tion (for related discussion see Adler-Nissen et al., 2017;
Daddow, 2019; Roederer-Rynning & Matthews, 2019).
3. A Framework for Considering EU Roles
This article makes the initial assumption that the EU will
have problems in defining its international roles in the
post-Brexit world, and that the presence of post-Brexit
Britain will play a substantial part in shaping this process
of role definition. Partly, this reflects the historical real-
ity that the two entities have had such problems dur-
ing the UK’s membership of the European project, that
those problems have intersected in the development of
‘European foreign policy’ and other areas of external ac-
tion, and that there is no reason to expect that the prob-
lemswill go away just because theUK is no longer amem-
ber state. Partly also, it reflects the global background,
in which the international opportunity structure for all
actors has been shaped and reshaped by global power
1 In this article, the purpose is to focus on a broad definition of external action, rather than on ‘foreign policy’ in the narrower sense. Using such a defi-
nition enables a fuller comparison and study of linkages between issue areas, and corresponds to the definition used both in the Lisbon Treaty and in
the EU Global Strategy.
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shifts that are still incomplete and ambiguous. For the
EU, there is the perennial question about whether it can
or should make the transition from a diplomacy rooted
in ‘civilian’ and normative considerations to a version of
external action that accepts the risks and costs of a ‘real’
foreign policy rooted more in considerations of hard se-
curity and geopolitics, whilst retaining a distinctive ap-
proach to economic and cultural aspects of external ac-
tion (M. Smith, 2006).
One way of developing these and related arguments
is to undertake an analysis based in ideas of interna-
tional roles. Such an analysis has roots in the work of
Holsti (1970), has been developed by others (for exam-
ple Aggestam, 2004, 2006; Hill, 1993, 1998), and has
been given new dimensions by the deployment of discur-
sive and constructivist as well as rationalist approaches
(Elgström & Smith, 2006; Knodt & Princen, 2003, Part I;
see also Gaskarth, 2013, for a related study of British for-
eign policy, and Daddow, 2019, for an application to UK
post-Brexit roles). In the context of this article, it consti-
tutes a means of establishing linkages and tensions be-
tween the discourses of globalism identified earlier and
the practices of EU external action in specific domains.
Simply put, the conversion of discourses and aspirations
into actions and impacts is given focus by an exploration
of roles. More specifically, it is given focus by four as-
pects of role analysis: role conceptions, role institutional-
isation, role performance and role impact (adapted from
Elgström & Smith, 2006, pp. 6–7):
• Role conceptions encompass both actors’ self-
images and related narratives and the effects of
others’ role expectations, and the prompt inves-
tigation of the interplay between these two ele-
ments. They give rise to discussion of the extent
to which actors can develop distinctive roles and
can transfer or reproduce those roles in a variety
of contexts. Discussion of the ways in which actors
can play leadership (or followership) roles in spe-
cific areas of international life, or the extent which
their conceptions of their role embody normative
considerations, is a logical implication of a focus on
role conceptions.
• Role design and institutionalisation concerns the
extent to which and the ways in which particular
roles are formally embodied in strategies and em-
bedded in institutional arrangements. In relation
to design, the part played by preferences and by
understandings of identity and of norms is cen-
tral; in relation to institutions, the ways in which
both external and internal institutional arrange-
ments are shaped by and reflect particular under-
standings of an actor’s role(s) is a key element
for analysis.
• Role performance concerns the extent to which
and the ways in which a role is played—in other
words, the actual behaviour of an actor. It is also in-
fluenced by external perceptions of how a certain
role should be, has been and is enacted. Role per-
formance also entails a measure of flexibility and
interpretation on the part of an actor—and thus a
focus on theways in which the enactment of a role
(discursively or materially) changes the role itself.
• Role impact concerns an actor’s ability to achieve
desired effects, and thus such elements as effec-
tiveness (goal realisation), efficiency (gains versus
costs) and legitimacy (achievement of recognised
status). But it also concerns the extent to which an
actor can embed its role into the global arena and
act as an agent of international structural change.
Not only this, but the possibility of effects that are
unplanned and unexpected can affect an actor’s
role and perceptions of it by others.
Elements of role analysis generate important questions
related to the nature of EU external action in a post-
Brexit world. Most importantly for the discussion here,
they raise issues relating to the establishment of stable
role conceptions and related narratives, their translation
into action and performance and their likely effects both
in the global arena and on the EU itself. In each of these
areas, it must be remembered that roles are developed
and played in a context, or a set of linked contexts: the
implications of this for communication and negotiation
in linked arenas, and for consistency, compatibility and
credibility are crucial to role performance and role im-
pact especially. The challenge posed by Brexit in these
respects is at a high level: it is a process ofmajor complex-
ity and long duration, affecting many linked arenas and
undertaken in a fluid and ambiguous global setting (cf.
Rosamond, 2016). Faced by such a challenge, will the fo-
cus for the EU be on innovation and creativity in external
action, or on standard operating procedures and the ap-
plication of established rules and conventions? The next
section of the article explores three policy domains with
the aim of providing some initial evidence for evaluation.
4. Global Britain, Global Europe?
In this section, the focus is on three areas of policy in
which the UK and the EU are strongly engaged at the
global level, and will remain engaged post-Brexit. They
are: trade and development policy; transatlantic rela-
tions and security; and defence policy. Each of these is
an area in which key areas of policy divergence have
been identified in the debates of the past three years;
although there are clearly other areas such as environ-
mental politics that might have been selected, reasons
of space and centrality lie behind this selection. In each
case, the aim is to provide a brief probe of the area in
order to clarify the kinds of questions that are likely to
be faced by the EU in the post-Brexit world. Each case
also cannot be taken in isolation from the others, and
whilst it is clear that security and defence policies will
be a key source of challenges post-Brexit (Martill & Sus,
2018; Whitman, 2016), our definition of EU external ac-
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 83–92 85
tion requires that it is placed in the broader context of EU
diplomacy and the development of the EU’s global roles.
In the final section of the article, the argument returns
to the issues of discourse and role outlined above.
4.1. Trade and Development Policies
For the EU, the foundations of European integration in
economic and commercial activity, and the extent to
which the EU’s international presence is still defined by
its position as a ‘trading state’ focused on multilateral-
ism and global governance, are deeply embedded in its
international strategies and external action (M. Smith,
2004). This is not essentially changed by Brexit, but it
is given a new twist, given that the UK could become a
significant regional competitor in trade and commerce
whatever form of Brexit emerges in the next few years.
Not only this, but the ‘subtraction’ of the UK from the
EU trade policy-making process could have significant
effects on the internal balance of forces within the EU,
since it would weaken the ‘liberalising’ camp of northern
member states.
For the EU, Brexit constitutes a major if not fun-
damental challenge. As Silke Trommer (2017) has ar-
gued, the UK will be repositioned as a ‘middle power’
in a rapidly changing international political economy, in
which the rivalries among ‘great powers’, especially the
US and China, have taken a central place. The aspiration
to initiate and conclude major free trade agreements on
a global scale with established and emerging commercial
giants implies a number of challenges for Britain, espe-
cially since the process of Brexit itself has drawn atten-
tion oncemore to the vulnerability of the country in both
the commercial and the political spheres. This is also a
challenge for the EU, since it implies that the UK could
become a significant rival in pursuing the effective gov-
ernance of global trade, and that (in principle, at least)
it could form new alliances in the global trading system.
The EU will need to engage with the UK—indeed, it is
already engaged—in renegotiation of their positions in
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other institu-
tions, and the evidence so far from attempts to re-shape
tariff quotas and other arrangements indicates precisely
that other WTO members are unlikely to just go along
with the UK–EU proposals. This is a matter of central
importance for the UK’s attempts to re-establish itself
as a leading force in the global trading regime; and it
also coincides with a more general politicisation of trad-
ing arrangements, led by the Trump Administration, that
bodes ill for both the EU as a major trading and invest-
ment partner of the US and the UK as a potential peti-
tioner for new trade agreements.
In the area of trade, therefore, the EUhas amajor and
established role, which it is finding difficult to pursue in
a changing and more politicised environment but which
gives a strong basis for strategic engagement. For the UK,
the issue is more fundamental, since the Brexit process
has exposed new vulnerabilities in a global political econ-
omywhere there is intense competition and an increased
level of bilateral as opposed to multilateral activity. This
might severely limit the UK’s ability to distance itself from
the EU, and thus restrict the extent to which it can shape
EU trade policies—a predicament that is at its sharpest in
discussions of a possible future customs union between
the EU and the UK. Whereas both the EU and the UK will
find it necessary to reflect on their roles in the global polit-
ical economy as a result of Brexit, there is no doubt about
which of the two parties starts from the stronger position.
Much will depend upon the nature of any emerging ar-
rangements between the UK and the EU themselves (see
for example Owen, Stojanovic, & Rutter, 2017): will they
resemble an ‘economic partnership’ rather like that re-
cently concluded between the EU and Japan, a customs
union, or an European Economic Area-type association?
Each of these would have important implications for the
external action of the EU—but all of them will have to be
pursued within a global system in flux with a high level
of ‘competitive interdependence’ (Sbragia, 2010) and in-
creasing elements of economic nationalism.
The roles played by both the UK and the EU in
development policy have been distinctive and influen-
tial. Significantly, this area in the EU structure is one
in which the member states contribute to collective ef-
forts but also retain their own national policies and re-
sources. There is clearly therefore a complex set of in-
teractions in the framing and conduct of development
policy, and to that extent the post-Brexit situation for
the EU might be little changed from the already estab-
lished policy processes. A key element of the context
is also that important aspects of the EU’s development
policies have been strongly influenced by first the acces-
sion of the UK and then its role within the development
policy structures. Relations with developing countries in
the context of European development policies came to
act, both for the UK and the EU, as another means of
managing relations with a wide array of Commonwealth
countries in the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific regions
(ACP).Most developing countries (but not those in South
Asia) within the Commonwealth have been and are sub-
scribers to the Lomé and Cotonou Conventions, the prin-
cipal frameworks for managing EU relations with devel-
oping countries.
For the EU, the impact of the UK on its development
assistance policies has thus been deep, continuous and
growing, reinforced by the fact that the UK is a major
donor country both in the bilateral context and within
the EU framework. The Lomé and Cotonou conventions
have collectivised large parts of the obligations assumed
by member states, although as already noted there has
remained a substantial bilateral aid effort on the part of
most member states including the UK. For the UK, the
Lomé and Cotonou processes, and the broader evolution
of EU development policies, have provided a route to
leadership and leverage, whilst perpetuating significant
elements of autonomy at the national level. The UK has
proved a dynamic if not always positive influence, and
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has played a key role in the movement of development
policies away from an altruistic model and towards a se-
curitised model in recent years (Carbone, 2017).
The potential impact of Brexit on EU development
policies and on the Commonwealth countries included
within EU frameworks will thus be significant. The pro-
cess of Brexit itself, characterised by complexity, uncer-
tainty and an extended negotiation and implementation
process whatever the eventual outcome, has created
anxiety over both the quantity and the qualities of de-
velopment policies. The EU will need to adjust its de-
velopment assistance policies to cater for the loss of
the UK’s contribution, and to adapt to the fact that the
Commonwealth members of the Cotonou framework
will no longer have a direct advocate in the form of
the UK. The more general processes of (re)negotiation
of free trade agreements and other arrangements will
create work for the EU in relation to both developing
and developed members of the Commonwealth, whilst
the changed internal balance of forces as a result of the
British departure may underline dynamics leading to a
‘re-nationalisation’ of some aspects of development pol-
icy (see Price, 2019).
The UK exit from the EU will thus create potential
costs and risks as well as opportunities for the EU in
relation to development policy (Carbone, 2017; Henökl,
2017; Price, 2016). For the UK, the loss of a base in
the EU through which to collectivise and multilateralise
their obligations to a range of Commonwealth develop-
ing countries will require new resources and effort. For
the EU, the loss of a major if sometimes irritating con-
tributor to the development and implementation of poli-
cies will have uncertain effects, perhaps especially if the
UK takes an activist view of the development of its rela-
tions with developing country Commonwealthmembers.
A saving grace is the fact that the parallel but linked na-
ture of existing development policies and processes has
already created a set of expectations and arrangements
for the management of bilateral and multilateral activi-
ties on the ground, which can be adapted or extended
to encompass a post-Brexit context. To this extent, there
are foundations for creating new and stable roles, and
for building on established institutions and practices, but
the existence of key challenges from other sources (for
example China) will complicate the position both for the
EU and for the UK.
4.2. Transatlantic Relations
As is well documented, the British claim to occupy a spe-
cial position in relations between the US and Europe has
been a persistent source of tensions, expectations and
disappointments especially for the British themselves. It
was noted earlier in this article that the persistence of
the ‘three circles’ image in UK foreign policy has been
central to the persistence of globalist ambitions in the UK
more generally. It is thus no surprise that part of the dis-
course of globalism surrounding the Brexit debates has
been the assumed ability of London to rekindle a ‘spe-
cial relationship’ with Washington which would provide
a major buttress to the ‘global Britain’ aspirations nur-
tured by Boris Johnson, Liam Fox and others (Daddow,
2019; Hill, 2019; Oliver, 2018). At the centre of this revi-
talized ‘special relationship’ would lie a comprehensive
UK–US free trade deal, and at the same time a revitalized
security connection through NATO as well as through
the existing intelligence links established during the Cold
War and since greatly developed.
For the EU, the idea of ‘special relationships’ is not by
any means irrelevant, but is not centred on the idea that
the UK has some sort of privileged position on grounds
of history, institutions or culture. Indeed, it can plausibly
be argued that each and every EU member state has a
kind of ‘special relationship’ with the US, and that the
tensions between different claims in this area has been
a continuing theme of the EU’s development both as a
whole and also especially in the post-Cold War era. The
tension between three key threads in the EU’s relations
with the US—‘special relationships’, transatlantic gover-
nance and world order—has been a constant theme in
the development of the Union as an international actor
since the early 1990s, whatever the nature of the admin-
istration in Washington and whatever the issues at stake
(M. Smith, 2011).
The current conjuncture in transatlantic relations,
though, poses new challenges (Stelzenmüller, 2018;
Stokes, 2018; Wickett, 2018). The emergence of an ad-
ministration that places its bets on a policy of ‘America
first’, with a President whose position on key issues
can fluctuate almost from hour to hour, has given rise
to an atmosphere in which the search for multilat-
eral solutions—as almost automatically espoused by the
EU—has been supplanted by unilateral initiatives, often
strongly influenced by ‘domesticist’ assumptions on the
part of Washington. This is apparent in issues of global
political economy, with the declaration of ‘trade war’ be-
tween the US and China and the demand for bilateral
concessions on the part of other trading partners; it is
evident in issues of international security, from dealing
with Russia through challenging the Iran nuclear plan of
action (seenwhen it was concluded as amajor win for EU
diplomacy especially in Brussels) to declaring a unilateral
withdrawal from engagement with the Syrian conflict;
and it is apparent in the systematic erosion and down-
grading of mechanisms of global governance, including
those addressing issues of human rights and environ-
mental protection, along with the promotion of ‘transna-
tional nationalism’ in Europe and elsewhere. Challenging
behaviour on the part of US administrations is not new,
but for the post-Brexit EU, the challenge of dealing with
what in the 1970s was termed a ‘rogue elephant in the
forest’ (Vernon, 1973) is perhaps more pressing than at
any previous time, especially since it is accompanied by
the radical shifts in the global opportunity structure and
the nature of broader challenges in the global political
economy and security noted earlier.
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As in some of the other areas outlined earlier, it is
clear that one of the challenges posed by Brexit in this
context is the loss of solidarity and ‘political economies
of scale’ precipitated by the UK’s exit. This is particularly
a challenge for the UK, since it appears that there is no
guarantee at all that they will be able to secure the revi-
talised ‘special relationship’ so dear to the hearts of the
Brexiteers—especially not on terms that bring any ben-
efits at all in political economy or the revitalisation of
NATO (Wilson, 2017). The loss is not negligible for the
EU: The defection of a leading member state, coupled
with the confrontational politics of the Washington ad-
ministration and the general resurgence of geopolitics
as a means of shaping global structures and processes,
means that the Union is at risk of being marginalised in a
variety of important global arenas. It is not clear that the
assumed benefits from the absence of the UK—ability
to go further in security and defence cooperation promi-
nent among them (see next section)—will be sufficient to
compensate for the broader erosion of the EU’s status as
an international actor that is implicit in the development
of transatlantic relations within the broader state of in-
ternational flux. The EU as a ‘trading state’ or as a ‘norma-
tive power’ loves stability and sustainability for a reason:
because stability and sustainability of relationships and
institutions are central to the achievement of commer-
cial gains and the preservation of the European project it-
self. Brexit is only one of the elements threatening these
aims in transatlantic relations—but it undoubtedly plays
its part.
4.3. Security and Defence Policy
Whatever might be said about the importance of Britain
to EUpolicies in other areas, it has been taken for granted
throughout the period of UK membership that the coun-
try has a special status in security and defence policy.
Along with France, the UK has been one of the only two
EU member states with a full-spectrum military capabil-
ity and the ability to intervene outside the European the-
atre on a large scale. Not only this, but (againwith France)
the UK was instrumental during the late 1990s in es-
tablishing the framework for what has now become the
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); although
its record in recent years has reflected a strong tendency
to constrain the possibilities for EU action in ‘hard secu-
rity’, theUK has always been seen as central to any poten-
tial EU role in the framing of collectivemilitary action and
to action in broader security policy (Hill, 2019, Chapter 4).
This central position has been buttressed by the distinc-
tive UK position in relation to intelligence-gathering, as
a member of the ‘five eyes’ grouping, which in turn has
reflected a deep and cumulative relationship with the US
especially. The EU’s role in the absence of the UK is thus
likely to be constrained, and indeed it might retreat from
some of the more ambitious security and defence roles
that have been the subject of debate since the late 1990s.
Given the changing nature of security itself, and the new
types of threats that have emerged in the 21st century,
the UK’s position inmatters relating to cyber security, en-
ergy security and environmental security is also likely to
matter when it comes to the forging of a security and de-
fence role for the Union in a post-Brexit world.
There is another side to this story, of course, and
there are those who argue that the departure of the
Uk will bring about a form of liberation for the Union—
indeed, that it already has done so in the period
since the 2016 UK referendum (Martill & Sus, 2018,
pp. 9–12). Thus, the initiation of Permanent Structured
Cooperation, a mechanism established by the Lisbon
Treaty but never formally acted upon until 2017, has
seen a step-change in the institutional support for de-
fence cooperation, despite the differing views among
member states about how inclusive or exclusive such
cooperation might be. The reinvigoration of measures
to take forward defence budgeting and defence indus-
trial cooperation among the 27 member states (exclud-
ing the UK) has reinforced a process of security and de-
fence integration that some have seen as leading to-
wards a true European defence policy (Strikwerda, 2019).
A new phase in Franco–German collaboration in security
and defence policy might also be in prospect, although
the two countries differ strongly on the assertiveness
and scope of EU defence actions. It has also been ar-
gued that EU policies towards some key adversaries, es-
pecially Russia, might be softened in the absence of the
UK, which has taken a strong line along with the US on
relations with the Putin regime.
The example of Russia , though, also points to amore
negative set of consequences for EU security and de-
fence policies. The growth of new types of risk—or old
types in new guises—has been characteristic of develop-
ments in both European and global security over the past
two decades, and a post-Brexit EU might be less capable
of addressing these, either because of the loss of UK ca-
pabilities or because of the newdynamics of relations be-
tween member states that might emerge in the absence
of the UK. As noted above, the loss of a key member of
the ‘five eyes’ intelligence network, and accompanying
loss of access to UK intelligence sources (not all of which
have been available to the Union whilst the UK has been
a member state) is clearly a significant risk factor. The
absence of a member state attuned to the ‘new geopoli-
tics’ of the 21st century, and one above all with a major
relationship with the US will be a key limiting factor in
the EU’s capacity to identify and to address new risks and
threats, let alone to respond to them. It is possible that
the loss of one of the two member states enjoying per-
manent membership of the UN Security Council will en-
tail costs in terms of the EU’s capacity to build coalitions
on key security issues (although Megan Dee and Karen
Smith, 2017, have argued that the UK, as in other areas,
hasmore to lose in this respect than the EU).When these
potential risk factors are combined with the growth of
fragmentation in the Union, and the potential for inter-
nal conflicts arising from populism and ‘illiberal democ-
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racy’, the likelihood of difficulties in expanding an EU role
in security and defence appears strong.
Whilst the achievablity of a ‘Global UK’ role in secu-
rity and defence post-Brexit can certainly be questioned
(seeDaddow, 2019;Whitman, 2016, andothers), the con-
cern here is with the possibility of new or changed roles
for the EU. In some ways, this depends upon the nature
of any post-Brexit relationship established with the UK.
Will that consist of a ‘CSDP Plus’ arrangement where the
UK has close links to and access to the CSDP process? Or
will it centre on an intensified relationship within NATO
(of which a number of EU member states are not mem-
bers)? Orwill it devolve into a series of bilateral UK agree-
ments with individual EU member states, such as that al-
ready established with France? These threemodels have
been explored in detail by Martill and Sus in a major re-
cent study (Martill & Sus, 2018), but in the absence (at
the time of writing) of any implementable agreement
even on the terms of UK withdrawal, there is no way
of predicting what the ‘deep and special relationship’ re-
ferred to by UK policy-makers might be. For the EU, the
distinctions between the three models matter, since the
extent to which the UK can continue to play a substan-
tive role in the CSDP, or take a leading role in NATO, or
detach EU member states through bilateral agreements,
carries with it a set of potential constraints and oppor-
tunities for EU security and defence polcies. As argued
elsewhere in this article, however, these are far from the
only potential forces likely to shape EU security and de-
fence policy. How far does the subtraction of Britain out-
weigh changes in US security and defence policy, the rise
of the ‘new geopolitics’, the weaponization of trade pol-
icy or the fragmentation of consensus within the Union
as a source of risks and opportunities? There is no doubt
that in security and defence policy, the absence of the
UK will be felt, but these other forces will do as much
if not more to shape and constrain the EU’s capacity for
external action in this area for the foreseeable future.
5. Conclusions
As noted immediately above, Brexit is only one of a num-
ber of factors contributing to a generalised sense of flu-
idity and uncertainty in the global arena of the early 21st
century. Power shifts between leading international ac-
tors, the possibility of conflict between those actors in
both the global political economy and areas of ‘high poli-
tics’ and security, the transnationalised challenges to do-
mestic political and economic elites in a number of re-
gions, and the growth of unilateralism and bilateralism
in a world where the rules-based liberal order is increas-
ingly under threat—each and all of these forces has im-
portant implications for the capacity of global actors to
form consistent strategies and establish stable roles. To
this, the EU is no exception. There is thus an important
distinction to be drawn between the incentives and con-
straints that characterise the global arena and the (linked
but distinguishable) incentives and constraints arising
from the mutual relations of the UK and the EU during
and after the completion of the Brexit process.
Given this context, what can we say about the EU’s
search for new or modified international roles in the ar-
easwehave briefly examined?Here,we can return to the
four central elements of role analysis noted earlier in the
article. In terms first of role conceptions, it seems clear
that the EU has confronted difficulties in establishing sta-
ble sets of understandings and expectations both at a
general ‘historical’ level and in themore specific areas ex-
amined in this article. It appears, however, that the chal-
lenge ismuch greater for theUK than it is for the EU, since
there is considerable conflict between the different nar-
ratives of the UK’s actual and potential roles in the four
areas. For the EU, contention between different under-
standings of Europe’s global role(s) is almost a fact of life,
and Brexit does little to disturb this set of circumstances:
In fact, in some of the areas examined, it appears that
Brexit simplifies the challenge for the EU, given the re-
duction in internal contention about external action (but
with the caveat that with the growth of contending elites
within the EU, there might emerge new constraining fac-
tors). Thus, in trade, at the global level, there is little that
challenges the EU’s essential conception of its roles (see
alsoDeVille and Siles-Brugge, this issue). In development
policy there are alreadymechanisms and understandings
that can accommodate the change in UK status, albeit
with a material subtraction of resources from the EU’s
inventory. Transatlantic relations pose a challenge both
to the UK and to the EU, and for both there is a danger
of marginalisation or renewed dependency—thus a chal-
lenge to established role conceptions in both cases. This
is partly also evident in matters of security and defence
policy, where the incentives for continued collaboration
are strong but are accompanied by equally strong forces
creating the potential for divergence.
As concerns role design and institutionalisation, a
key challenge for the UK is the need to re-invent parts
of its role and to re-establish the legitimacy of its pres-
ence in areas where its role has been externalised or
sub-contracted to the EU. For the EU, the challenge is
that of finding devices with which to perpetuate close
collaboration with the UK on different terms. Thus, given
continued economic interdependence, the aim of keep-
ing the UK very close in commercial terms andmanaging
(read: constraining) any divergence on the part of the UK
from existing rules and institutions is likely to be a cen-
tral shaping element in any post-Brexit EU strategy. At
the same time, the emphasis in the EUGlobal Strategy on
‘joined up policy-making’ and the use of resources from
across the EU institutions can be read in part as a pre-
emptive assertion of a new style of EU policy-making for
post-Brexit conditions (but with the caveat noted above:
Brexit is only one of a number of forces shaping EU strat-
egy). As noted above, mechanisms will need to be found
for managing the inevitable interactions between the UK
and the EU in contexts such as theWTO, and for handling
the kinds of ‘bi-multilateral’ issues of global governance
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that could create damaging externalities and loss of lever-
age on the part of the UK and the EU alike. The same is
true of relations with the developing countries: arguably
the EU is now much more important for many ACP coun-
tries than the UK alone, but both the UK and the EU are
confronted by challenges from new or emerging actors
and from the new geopolitics of aid. In transatlantic re-
lations, divergence between the UK’s and the EU’s roles
might become institutionalised via trade agreements or
through differing attitudes to NATO, for example, but the
real challenges for the EU are in the broader geopolit-
ical and geo-economic forces expressed through ‘com-
petitive interdependence’ and transactional diplomacy
at the global level. In matters of security and defence,
there is again the interplay of UK–EU and broader global
forces, but as already noted there are strong incentives
to support institutional innovation and re-design on the
part of the EU.
In terms of role performance, the jury is by definition
out and will be out for some time: The effects on both
the UK and the EU’s capacity to create, implement and
sustain effective roles in the global arena will emerge
over decades rather than months or years. But it is im-
portant to point out the close links between role per-
formance and areas such as legitimacy, credibility and
effectiveness. Whilst for the UK, there is almost an ex-
istential significance attached to its capacity for effec-
tive role performance post-Brexit, in all of the three ar-
eas discussed here, for the EU the stakes are arguably
lower—the defection of the UK may be regrettable, but
it does not undermine the Union’s ability to maintain
or develop the roles it has acquired over the past forty
years or more. There is a general problem of EU credi-
bility arising from the long-term effects of the economic
and financial crises, from the proliferation of right-wing
populist movements across EU member states and from
the new centrality of geopolitics and transactional diplo-
macy in the global arena—but although clearly linked
with the departure of the UK, this is distinct from any ef-
fects of Brexit narrowly defined. The discourse of global-
ism in the EU’s external action crystallised in the Global
Strategy, or the institutional incentives and constraints
affecting role performance, will not shift radically post-
Brexit or because of Brexit itself. Thus, the EU’s enact-
ment of its global role(s) will be more stable and sustain-
able (if limited bywell-known factors) than that of the UK
in a post-Brexit world.
Finally, it might be argued that role impact is the ul-
timate test of the ways in which role conceptions, role
design and development and role performance come to-
gether to create sustainable and stable foundations for
global influence. If this is the case, then the prognosis
for the UK’s role impact is distinctly uncertain. In all of
the areas discussed here, the UK confronts an uncertain
future characterised by a substantial gap between role
conceptions and the realities of international life outside
the EU—a future, moreover, that will require a substan-
tial allocation of attention and resources, human, psy-
chological and financial, for an extended period. For the
EU, despite the loss of the UK contribution in both tangi-
ble and intangible areas, the future is less challenging—
but with the qualification noted above that the global
arena is simplymore challenging for every actor engaged
in it, and particularly challenging for the Union as a con-
glomeratemulti-national structure. The effectiveness, ef-
ficiency and legitimacy of EU external actionwill thus not
be fundamentally undermined by the defection of the
UK, but it is likely to be challenged continuously by the
evolution of global politics and the global political econ-
omy in general.
On this basis, it is important to restate the initial ar-
gument in this article: that whilst the UK and the EU alike
have generated distinctive discourses of globalism on a
historical and current basis, the acid test for external ac-
tion is how and how far these actors can translate the dis-
course and attendant narratives into performable roles.
For the UK, this is a fundamental question of its interna-
tional life in a post-Brexit world. For the EU, on the other
hand, the post-Brexit world in global perspective resem-
bles broadly the world before 2016, in which the chal-
lenges of role stability, role conflict and role performance
reflect an array of wider and more potent forces. Whilst
these will be modified by the UK’s absence, they will not
be transformed. In terms of the initial assumption made
by the article—that Brexit would play a substantial role in
the redefinition of EU roles in the post-Brexit world—it is
clear from the argument here that whilst Brexit narrowly
definedwill undoubtedly have effects, these are less likely
to be fundamental than are the challenges to the EU’s
roles arising from the global arena more generally.
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